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China’s far below-replacement fertility and its long-term impact: 
Comments on the preliminary results of the 2010 census 
Zhongwei Zhao1 
Wei Chen2 
Abstract 
The Chinese government conducted its sixth national census in 2010 and released its 
major results in April 2011. According to the National Bureau of Statistics the quality 
of the census was very high. Although the currently released census results consist of 
limited statistics only, they shed new light on China’s recent fertility levels, which have 
been debated among scholars and policy makers for more than a decade. The 2010 
census results, however, also show considerable inconsistencies with those published 
by the United Nations Population Division recently. This paper will, on the basis of 
newly published census results and other available evidence, further examine China’s 
recent fertility decline and its impact on the country’s long-term development. It will 
also comment on the major discrepancies between the results of Chinese government 
recent population projection, the United Nations’ World Population Prospects, the 2010 
Revision and China’s 2010 census, and investigate the underlying causes that have led 
to these differences. 
1 Australian National University. E-mail: zhongwei.zhao@anu.edu.au. 
2 People's University, China. E-mail: weichen@ruc.edu.cn. 
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1. Introduction 
The Chinese government conducted its sixth national census in 2010 and released its 
major results in April 2011. According to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) the 
quality of the census was very high and its net under-enumeration rate was only 0.12%, 
which is significantly better than the 1.81% recorded in the fifth census carried out in 
2000 (NBS 2011a). This under-enumeration rate is also much lower than those 
observed in recent censuses undertaken in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK, 
and the USA, most of which were between 1.5% and 3% (Abbott 2008; Australian 
Bureau of Statistics 2003; British Columbia Statistics 2003; Groves 2010; Statistics 
New Zealand 2011). 
Although the currently released census results consist of limited statistics only, 
they shed new light on China’s recent fertility levels, which have been debated among 
scholars and policy makers since the publication of the 2000 census results some ten 
years ago. However, the census results have shown notable inconsistencies with those 
obtained from some other demographic data sources. In this paper we will investigate 
the major discrepancies between the results of Chinese government recent population 
projection, the United Nations’ World Population Prospects, the 2010 Revision and 
China’s 2010 census, and comment on our current understanding of China’s recent 
fertility changes. Based on the newly published census results and other available 
evidence, we will also examine China’s continuous fertility decline and its impact on 
the country’s future sustainable development. 
 
 
2. China’s fertility has been well below replacement level:  
    New evidence from the 2010 census 
In the newly released census results China’s national population has been divided into 
three broad age groups. In Table 1 the number of people in these age groups is listed in 
the upper panel and its percentage distribution in the lower panel of column 5. The table 
presents similar statistics from other data sources for comparison. Figures in column 4 
are obtained from World Population Prospects, the 2010 Revision, published by the 
United Nations (UN), which is also called as the UN 2010 Population Projections. The 
percentage distributions in column 3 were recorded by the 2009 Annual Population 
Change Sample Survey conducted by the NBS.3 The population numbers have been 
3  The Chinese government did not conduct an annual population change survey in 2010. The reported 
population figures for that year were estimated from, and are therefore very close to, the census results. 
Because of this they are not presented in the table. 
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calculated directly by the authors using the sample ratio (the proportion of the sampled 
population in the national population), sample size, and the age distribution of the 
sampled population, which is based on the assumption that sample ratios were the same 
in all three age groups.4 
 
Table 1: Distribution of the Chinese population by broad age groups 
 Age group 2009 2010 2010 
Population (in millions)     
 0-14 225 261 222 
 15-59 916 915 940 
 60 + 193 165 178 
 Total 1335 1341 1340 
Proportion (%)     
 0-14 16.9 19.5 16.6 
 15-59 68.6 68.2 70.1 
 60 + 14.5 12.3 13.3 
 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Data sources  Annual Survey UN 2010 Projection 2010 Census 
 
Sources: NBS (2010); NBS (2011a); UN (2011). 
 
According to the census, the number of people aged 15-59 was 940 million in 
2010. This figure is reasonably close to the 915 million obtained from the UN 2010 
population projections and consistent with the 916 million estimated from China’s 
annual population change survey data for 2009 (NBS 2011a; UN 2011).5 The census 
result is about 24 million, or nearly 3%, greater than the other two figures.6 According 
to the 2010 census, the number of people aged 60 and over was 178 million. This is 
about 13 million, or more than 7%, greater than the 165 million estimated by the UN 
                                                          
4 Ideally, we would like to use sample ratios by age groups, but such information is not available.  
5 We can only use annual population change survey data to estimate the figure for 2009, because similar data 
are not available for 2010. 
6 In this and other places, the following formula is used to compare the difference between population figures 
obtained from different data sources: Percentage difference = (results of 2010 census – results from other data 
sources) ÷ results of 2010 census. That the number of people aged 15-59 estimated from the 2009 annual 
population change survey is smaller than that recorded by the 2010 census may be partly explained by the 
annual survey under-recording young people in this age group, because they were more likely to be migrants 
and be missed out in the enumeration. But the census made considerable effort to reduce such impacts. In the 
2010 census, migrants are enumerated in both their home town (i.e., where their household registration was 
kept) and where they lived.  
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2010 population projections, while it is 15 million, or approximately 8%, smaller than 
the estimated 193 million from the annual population survey results for 2009.7 
China’s 2010 census recorded 222 million children aged 0-14, which is consistent 
with the 225 million estimated for 2009 from the annual population survey data. 
However, the census result is markedly lower than the 261 million estimated by the UN 
2010 population projections. The difference between them is more than 38 million, or 
the census result is about 18% smaller.  
This large difference leads to a number of questions. If the under-enumeration rate 
of children aged 0-14 in the 2010 census was indeed very low or close to the overall 
under-enumeration rate reported by the NBS, what kind of fertility level does the census 
result imply? As indicated by the above discussion, the number of women of 
reproductive age obtained from the UN 2010 population projections is reasonably close 
to that recorded by China’s 2010 census. Accordingly, the major difference in the 
numbers of 0-14 year olds is most likely to have been caused by the gap in the fertility 
levels of the two populations. In the UN population projections the average Total 
Fertility Rates (TFRs) for the periods 1995-2000, 2000-2005, and 2005-2010 were 1.80, 
1.70, and 1.64, respectively (UN 2011). If the number of those aged 0-14 were recorded 
accurately by the 2010 census, China’s actual TFRs must be considerably lower than 
those suggested by the UN Population Division for the years 1995 to 2010 (or the UN 
Population Division has significantly over-estimated the number of children in this age 
group). Because the census-recorded number of women aged 15-49 was very likely to 
be larger than that estimated by the UN Population Division, it could lower the fertility 
rate further. 
Then how low could China’s recent fertility have been if the census-recorded 
number of children were accurate? To answer this question we have carried out the 
following exercise. We first selected and determined the population in 1990, which had 
the same size and age and sex structure as that used in the UN 2010 population 
projections. This has been used as our starting population. We then selected age 
patterns of fertility and age-specific mortality rates that are in general also very similar 
to those used in the UN population projections. In this exercise we did not consider the 
influence of international migration, because its impact on China’s short-term 
7 A possible explanation for the difference in the number of people aged 60 and over between the census 
result and that estimated from the 2009 annual population change survey results could be that, at the time of 
the annual survey, household registration of some deceased people (who were most likely to have died at old 
ages) were not cancelled after their death. Hence, they might still have been recorded in the survey. However, 
the Chinese government systematically updated household registration before the census. This greatly 
improved the quality of household registers and contributed to the reduction in the recorded number of people 
aged 60 and over in the 2010 census. As for the difference between the UN population projection result and 
the census result, it is very likely to be related to the difference in mortality estimated by the UN Population 
Division and recorded by the 2010 census. While the level of census-recorded mortality could be affected by 
enumeration problems, we have not been able to examine this due to data availability. 
Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 26 
http://www.demographic-research.org 823
population changes is very small. The major difference between the UN 2010 
population projection and ours is that we have lowered fertility levels from 1.80 to 1.60 
for 1995-2000, from 1.70 to 1.45 for 2000-2005, and from 1.64 to 1.45 for 2005-2010. 
Because of this our projection, in comparison with that made by the UN Population 
Division, is expected to produce a population in which the number of those aged 0-14 is 
closer to that recorded by the 2010 census. We have used this method to estimate the 
population for the last two decades and to project it into the future. According to this 
projection, the number of children aged 0-14 will be 229 million by the end of 2010, 
which is still several million larger than the figure reported by the census. This suggests 
that, if the census records were accurate, the average TFR would be lower than 1.60 for 
1995-2000 and lower than 1.45 for the past 10 years. They are all considerably lower 
than the 1.8 reported by the Chinese government in recent years. 
The above comparison leads to the following conclusions. The number and 
proportion of 0-14 year olds recorded by the 2010 census are highly consistent with 
those estimated for 2009 from the annual population change survey data. They are also 
very consistent with the declining trend of those aged 0-14, which was discovered by 
the annual population change surveys conducted in the past 15 years (Zhao 2011), 
although they are markedly smaller than those estimated by the UN 2010 population 
projections. These results show that if the 2010 census indeed accurately enumerated 
those aged 0-14, the average TFR for 1996-2010 would be significantly lower than the 
1.8 reported by the Chinese government, and for the last decade the TFR was very 
likely to have been lower than 1.45. 
 
 
3. Is there evidence suggesting that China’s recent fertility has been  
    much higher than that indicated by the 2010 census results? 
While the suggestion made in the last section is very plausible, it is not conclusive and 
therefore requires further investigation. As Table 1 shows, if the 2010 census records of 
0-14 year olds were of high quality the UN 2010 population projections would have 
over-estimated the number of children of these ages by more than 38 million, indicating 
an over-estimation of China’s fertility for the past 15 years. Otherwise, China’s actual 
fertility would have been much higher than that suggested by the 2010 census results. 
Assuming that the census data were accurate, how did the UN Population Division 
considerably over-estimate China’s recent fertility? This is likely to have resulted from 
the UN Population Division’s practice, when estimating and projecting population, of 
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relying heavily on the demographic data provided by member countries.8 Then is there 
evidence suggesting that the Chinese government has over-reported its fertility, which 
might have been used as the basis for the UN population projections? The answer is 
yes. 
As indicated by the discussion in the last section and that presented below. The 
number of people aged 0-14 recorded by the 2010 census ought to be consistent with 
the number of births reported by the NBS in the previous 15 years, if both of them are 
accurate. According to the NBS about 258 million births were recorded over the period 
from 1996 to 2010. If we assume that on average 3% of them died before the end of 
2010, then the number of those aged 0-14 and still alive would be about 251 million. If 
this estimated result were correct or very close to the actual number, the 2010 census 
would have under-counted around 28 million children aged 0-14. Although this number 
is about 10 million smaller than the gap of 38 million that is indicated by the UN 2010 
population projections, the question is whether there is evidence to support an under-
enumeration of this magnitude. 
As mentioned earlier, the net under-enumeration rate was only 0.12% in the 2010 
census, according to the Chinese government (NBS 2011a). If the large difference 
between the number of the census-recorded 0-14 year olds and that indicated by the 
officially reported number of children born in the previous 15 years were the result of 
under-enumeration, then the under-enumeration rate of children aged 0-14 in the census 
would be more than 11%. It is very unlikely that the net under-enumeration rate was so 
low in other age groups and so high among those aged 0-14– more than 90 times worse 
than that for the total population. Furthermore, the officially reported under-
enumeration rate also indicates that only about 1.6 million people were under-counted 
in the entire population. This means that if the gap of 28 million in the number of 0-14 
year olds all resulted from under-enumeration, then more than 26 million people aged 
15 and above must have been double counted in the census. According to Ma Jian-
Tang, the director of the NBS, this is also unlikely, because double counting of this 
kind was systematically checked and corrected before the census results were published 
(Ma 2011). 
It is important to point out that fertility data released by the Chinese government 
(or different government departments) have been inconsistent in the last 15 years (Gu 
and Cai 2009; Zhao and Zhang 2010). While fertility data reported by the National 
Population and Family Planning Commission and those endorsed by the State Council 
(which are often adjusted figures) have consistently shown a higher fertility, fertility 
8 As indicated by some studies (Cai 2011; Zhao 2011), in conducting its 2010 population projection for China 
the UN Population Division notably revised the fertility input parameters that it had used in the 2008 
population projection, which led to considerable differences in their results. But these revised fertility rates 
were still much higher than those suggested by many researchers. 
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levels revealed by unadjusted annual population change survey and fertility survey 
results have been much lower.9 There is considerable evidence suggesting that China’s 
fertility level has been over-inflated in recent years by the officially endorsed fertility 
statistics. For example, in the last 15 years all but one of the annual population change 
surveys and fertility surveys have recorded a consistently low fertility. While the 2006 
National Population and Family Planning Survey reported higher TFRs for 2005 and 
2006, they were subsequently found to have resulted from problems in sample selection 
(Zhao and Guo 2010; Zhao and Zhang 2010). These suggestions are further supported 
by a recent study which revealed that government-reported numbers of children aged 0-
14 were on average 7% greater than those calculated directly from the annual 
population sample survey results over the period 1996-2009 (Zhao 2011). 
In the last decade many studies have been undertaken investigating China’s recent 
fertility levels, and they have found that the number of births has been over-reported by 
the Chinese government for more than ten years (Qiao 2005; Zhang and Zhao 2006; 
Zhao and Zhang 2010). These studies have also provided consistent evidence showing 
that China’s TFR declined steadily from above replacement in 1990 to lower than 1.6 in 
2000. In the first decade of the 21st century it fell further and fluctuated around an even 
lower level (Cai 2008, 2010; Guo and Chen 2007; Retherford et al. 2005; Scharping 
2005; Zhao and Guo 2010). 
 
 
4. What would be the major impacts of China’s recent far  
below-replacement fertility? 
According to the evidence presented in the last two sections, China’s recent fertility 
levels are likely to have been significantly lower than those claimed by the government, 
and those estimated by the UN Population Division for the periods 1995-2000, 2000-
2005, and 2005-2010, published in World Population Prospects, the 2010 Revision. 
Therefore the population projection results reported by either the Chinese government 
or the UN Population Division may not accurately represent China’s actual 
demographic situation, and thus might not provide a reliable basis for developing long-
term socio-economic plans for the country. 
To illustrate their impacts we have extended our simple population projection, 
discussed in section one, to 2050. We have conducted a population projection that is in 
most respects very similar to the UN 2010 population projection for China, but we have 
lowered the fertility levels for 1995-2000 from 1.80 to 1.60, for 2000-2005 from 1.70 to 
                                                          
9  These results have often been published quietly and are regarded as affected by under-enumeration 
problems. 
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1.45, and for 2005-2010 from 1.64 to 1.45. Because of this the number of 0-14 year 
olds produced by our projection is reasonably close to that recorded by the 2010 census. 
For the period 2010-2050 we have used the same TFRs published in World Population 
Prospects: the 2010 Revision by the UN Population Division, which vary between 1.51 
and 1.58 in years 2010-2030, and increase from 1.63 to 1.77 in years 2030-2050. We 
are aware that the fertility change made by us leads to an increase in TFR from 2010 to 
2011, and that it may be questionable if this is a realistic scenario. However, these rates 
are used in the exercise because one of its major objectives is to examine the impact of 
over-estimating fertility for 1995 to 2010. 
By prolonging the population projection to 2050 the results should shed light on 
the long-term impact of the lowered fertility on China’s future demographic changes. 
The comparison of the UN Population Division projection results and our projection 
results is shown in Table 2. Since most of their input parameters other than fertility 
rates for 1995-2010 are very similar, the major discrepancies between the two sets of 
projection results are caused largely by the different fertility parameters. We would like 
to compare the results produced by the population projection of the Chinese 
government in a similar way, but its detailed information and results are not available.10 
The following observations can be made from the comparison of the above-
mentioned population projection results and those reported by the Chinese government. 
The General Report on China’s National Strategy on Population Development, 
published in 2007, predicted a 2010 national population of around 1.35 billion. The 
general report also suggests that the national population will continue to grow and reach 
a peak of around 1.5 billion in 2033. After that it will start to decline, but China’s total 
population might still be more than 1.4 billion in 2050. China’s working age (15-64) 
population will reach a peak of 1.01 billion in 2016. Then it will fluctuate around 1 
billion for more than a decade before starting a long-term and rapid decline in the late 
2020s. By 2050 China’s working age population will be about 880 million. China’s 
elderly population (those aged 65 and over) will reach 11.2% of the national population 
in 2020 and further increase to 22% in late 2040 (National Strategy on Population 
Development Research Group 2007). 
The results of the UN 2010 population projections differ markedly in several 
aspects from those projected by the Chinese government. According to the UN 
population projections, China’s total population will reach its peak of less than 1.4 
billion in 2026. It will be about 1.38 billion in 2033 and less than 1.3 billion in 2050, 
much smaller than those projected by the Chinese government. China’s working age 
10 While The General Report on China’s National Strategy on Population Development mentioned some of 
the government-projected results, it did not provide detailed projection results like those published by the UN 
Population Division. Z. Guo has kindly showed us his population projections results. Among these results 
those produced by projection scenario 13 are very similar to those discussed in the general report, although 
there are also some differences. 
Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 26 
http://www.demographic-research.org 827
(15-64) population will also peak in 2016 at 996 million, or slightly lower than that 
projected by Chinese government. However, it will be less than 800 million in 2050, 
which is 90 million less than that reported by the Chinese government. As for the 
proportion of those aged 65 and over, the UN population projections show that it will 
be 12% in 2020, or slightly higher than that suggested by the Chinese government. But 
it will increase at a greater speed and reach about 26% in 2050. The old age dependency 
ratio will increase from currently less than 12 old people per 100 working-age 
population to 42 old people per 100 working-age population in the mid-21st century 
(United Nations 2011). 
 
Table 2: Population projection results made by the United Nations population 
division and ourselves 
Total Population 
(millions) 
Population aged 15-64
(millions) 
Proportion aged 65+ 
(%) Year 
UN 2010 
projection 
Authors’ 
projection 
UN 2010 
projection 
Authors’ 
projection 
UN 2010 
projection 
Authors’ 
projection 
2010 1,341 1,309 971 971 8.2 8.4 
2015 1,370 1,338 996 985 9.5 9.7 
2020 1,388 1,354 989 966 12.0 12.3 
2025 1,395 1,358 981 949 14.0 14.4 
2030 1,393 1,350 960 928 16.5 17.0 
2035 1,382 1,333 910 877 20.2 21.0 
2040 1,361 1,309 859 822 23.3 24.2 
2045 1,332 1,277 829 786 24.4 25.3 
2050 1,296 1,238 790 742 25.6 26.8 
 
Sources: UN (2011), the projection made by the authors. 
 
Because our projection has used lower fertility rates for 1995 to 2010 in 
comparison with those used in the UN population projections, the difference between 
our projection results and those reported by the UN Population Division are obvious. 
While our projected total population and working-age population will reach their peaks 
at about the same time as that suggested by the UN population projections, their size 
will be markedly smaller. According to our projection the Chinese population will reach 
1.36 billion in 2025, approximately 1.34 billion in 2033, and 1.24 billion in 2050. The 
working-age population will be about 985 million in 2016 and 742 million in 2050. The 
proportion of people aged 65 and over will be more than 12% in 2020 and reach 27% in 
2050. Our projected old-age dependency ratios are also higher than those projected by 
the UN Population Division. 
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In comparison with those projected by the Chinese government, our projected 
national population will be around 150 million less in 2033 and nearly 200 million less 
in 2050. Our projected working-age population will be about 15 million less in 2016, 
but the gap will increase to approximately 140 million in 2050. Our projected 
proportion of people aged 65 and over will be about 5% greater in the middle of the 
21st century. Differences of such a magnitude will have significant impacts on the 
formation of China’s future development plans and strategies, which in turn will greatly 
affect the long-term development and future of the country. 
 
 
5. Has our understanding of the current fertility situation, policy  
    responses, and development plans fallen behind China’s  
    demographic changes? 
If China’s fertility has indeed been very low, and the population projection results 
reported by both Chinese government and the UN Population Division have under-
estimated this change and its impacts, why and how could this have happened? 
Historically, it is not uncommon for social changes to take place faster than 
expected. One example is the extraordinary fertility decline of recent decades: a few 
decades ago few demographers thought that fertility could fall to and stay at far below 
replacement levels, but in many places this has now become reality. Even in some 
countries that had very high fertility some 40 years ago, TFRs are now well below 
replacement. In an article published in 1986 a well-known demographer Ronald 
Freedman acknowledged that he had underestimated the rate of fertility decline in 
Taiwan. He used this admission as an example to convince readers that “social 
scientists, including demographers, have consistently underestimated the rate at which 
social change can occur” (Freedman 1986:529). It is clear that our thinking and some 
policies have also considerably lagged behind the rapid fertility changes that have been 
taking place in mainland China. 
This is indicated by the fact that, for quite a long time, researchers (including 
ourselves) and policy makers did not believe that China’s fertility fell sharply in the 
early 1990s and declined further thereafter. Partly for this reason they tended to accept 
the suggestion that under-recording of births in some demographic surveys and 
population data was far more severe than what was actually observed. This led to a 
tendency to over-adjust certain fertility statistics. It is interesting to note that while 
China’s recent annual population change survey and fertility survey results have 
consistently shown a fertility far below replacement level, these results have been 
barely mentioned in official documents on China’s fertility and population changes. 
Some demographers started questioning these notions and practices in the first half of 
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the last decade, and several studies have been undertaken since (Cai 2008, 2010; Gu 
and Cai 2009; Qiao 2005; Retherford et al. 2005; Scharping 2005; Zhang and Zhao 
2006; Zhao and Guo2010; Zhao and Zhang 2010). This has gradually changed their 
views about China’s continuing fertility decline after it fell below replacement in the 
early 1990s. However, changes of this kind have not yet been observed among policy 
makers. 
Many policy makers and some scholars are not convinced that China’s fertility has 
been well below replacement level because they do not believe that profound changes 
have already taken place in the reproductive culture in Chinese society. It is interesting 
that in the discussion of economic development they were very confident that mainland 
China, just like Asia’s four small dragons (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and 
Taiwan), could achieve and maintain rapid economic growth, which has been proven 
correct. However, when addressing fertility decline these policy makers and scholars 
have been far less confident in suggesting that in Mainland China fertility reduction 
may also be similar to that experienced by its four small counterparts. Many people still 
consider that China’s current low fertility is largely a result of strict birth control 
imposed by the family planning program, rather than the outcome of a secular change in 
people’s fertility preferences. Following this reasoning they insist that China’s family 
planning policy must be upheld and every effort should be made to implement the 
government-led family planning program and that this remains a key step in 
implementing China’s National Strategy on Population Development (National Strategy 
on Population Development Research Group 2007).  
Although these views may not be entirely wrong, and family planning does still 
face difficulties in certain areas, it is important to acknowledge the significant change in 
reproductive culture since the early 1970s. After forty years of family planning and 
three decades of rapid socio-economic development, the small family has already been 
accepted as the reproductive norm by the majority of young people, who themselves 
have grown up in this new environment and have been subject to increasing 
international influences. Their ideal number of children has been falling, as shown  
by many surveys. There are also signs that son preference has been weakening  
among young people.11  According to the National Population and Family Planning 
Commission (NPFPC), China’s family planning rate (percentage of births having 
11 For example, a recent survey showed that the average ideal number of children was 1.74 among 1,700 
migrants from central and west China, and 1.58 for unmarried young migrants (Floating Population Research 
Group 2010). Another survey reported that the average ideal number of children was 1.72 among 1,300 
married women surveyed in three provinces of China. The survey also found weakening son preference in the 
study population: 56% stated that they preferred to have an equal number of sons and daughters, while 23% 
wanted more sons than daughters, and 21% wanted more daughters than sons. The percentage wanting more 
sons was still higher than that wanting more daughters across all age groups, but their difference is narrowing. 
The proportion of women who hoped to have an equal number of sons and daughters has risen from 46% for 
those aged over 35 to 64% for those aged under 30 (Sex Ratio at Birth Research Group 2010). 
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satisfied government birth control plans) has stabilized at the high level of 93% in 
recent years (NPFPC 2008). Running the family planning program has become much 
easier than before. Even in areas where each family has been allowed to have two 
children many couples have chosen to have one child, and the TFR has been below two 
children per woman. In most of these places relaxed family planning policies have not 
resulted in higher fertility in comparison to neighboring regions with stricter family 
planning policies (Cai 2010; Gu and Wang 2009; Zheng et al. 2009). All these are 
important indications that the major driving force of China’s current low fertility is no 
longer the strict birth control imposed by the government. It is worth mentioning that in 
Taiwan the TFR has not recuperated since it fell below replacement in 1984, but 
declined to a very low level in the last quarter of the 20th century. A similar change has 
been taking place in mainland China. This is part of profound social, demographic, and 
cultural changes that have been observed in many countries in the world. Even if the 
Chinese government relaxed its family planning policies it is very unlikely that China’s 
fertility would bounce back to and stay around the replacement level in the near future. 
Because of the notable lag between our thinking and the rapid socio-demographic 
changes, it is not surprising that some population projections and development plans 
have also fallen behind these changes. For example, The General Report on China’s 
National Strategy on Population Development insists that China will maintain its TFR 
at the level of 1.8 over the next 30 years. But it does not even discuss the possibility 
that fertility could fall below this level and, if it happens, how the much lower fertility 
could be lifted to this desired level, despite a considerable amount of evidence showing 
that such low fertility has already existed for more than a decade (National Strategy on 
Population Development Research Group 2007). Similarly, China’s recent fertility 
reduction and its long-term impact have been notably under-estimated by the population 
projections made by both the Chinese government and the UN Population Division, as 
shown earlier. These projections may not provide reliable demographic information for 
developing China’s long-term socio-economic plan, which will be very important for its 
future sustainable development. 
 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
The evidence presented in this paper shows that in recent years China’s officially 
endorsed fertility statistics seemed to have resulted from the politics of numbers rather 
than reflecting China’s demographic reality. For some policy makers the most 
important grounds on which to base their decision about China’s fertility levels are no 
longer the results of various fertility-related surveys and research findings made 
through detailed investigation, but other considerations. 
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There has been plenty of evidence showing that in the last 15 years the difficulty 
of promoting family planning has greatly reduced and the recorded fertility has been 
notably lower than 1.8 (Cai 2010; Gu et al. 2007; Gu and Cai 2009; Goodkind 2011; 
Retherford et al. 2005; Zhang and Zhao 2006; Zhao and Guo 2010; Zheng et al. 2009). 
However, the Chinese government has maintained that China’s TFR has been around 
1.8. Why has the government been particularly favorable to this number in reporting its 
fertility level? The selection of 1.8 seems not to be arbitrary or anecdotal, but to be 
related to the following characteristics of this figure: a TFR of 1.8 is below, but not too 
far from, replacement fertility. This fertility level would gradually reduce China’s 
population size, while not seriously upset its age structure, as would be the case with a 
much lower fertility level. It is also higher, but not markedly higher, than the policy 
fertility level established by the government. Therefore it can easily accommodate the 
argument that the family planning program has been significantly successful but still 
faces considerable challenges in implementing the government fertility policy. 
Accordingly, family planning work should be both awarded for its achievements and 
given further support because of its difficulties. 
The evidence presented in this paper and elsewhere suggests that for more than 15 
years China’s fertility has been notably lower than that reported by the government. It is 
also lower than that recently published in the World Population Prospects, the 2010 
Revision. If this is indeed the case, now is a good time for the NBS to update the 
population statistics published by the Chinese government in recent years. Similarly, if 
there is sufficient evidence showing that the UN 2010 population projection results 
have noticeably misrepresented China’s current demographic situation, the UN 
Population Division has a responsibility to revise its results. 
We have noted the large discrepancy in the number of people aged 0-14 when 
comparing China’s 2010 population figures and the UN 2010 population projections. 
Despite the significant gap, the total population of China projected by the UN 
Population Division is remarkably close to that reported by the Chinese government 
(UN 2011, NBS 2011b). As expected, the UN Population Division’s projections for the 
15-64 and 65+ age groups are both noticeably smaller than those reported by the 
Chinese government. This leads to another intriguing and perhaps more complicated 
question: what has caused these differences (especially when the UN projection for the 
number of children is considerably larger than the figure reported by the Chinese 
government)? We are not able to complete the investigation of this question, because it 
requires detailed data on population by smaller age groups and information on recent 
mortality, especially old age mortality, which are not yet available. 
In this commentary we have reached several conclusions concerning China’s 
recent fertility levels. We are aware of the uncertainty of some of these conclusions and 
suggestions, partly arising from our assumption that the quality of China’s 2010 census 
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was high, as claimed by the Chinese authorities. Similarly, we are aware of that the 
enumeration problems in the 2010 census can be far more complex than those reported 
by the NBS. Under-recording is very likely to have been distributed unevenly among 
major age groups. Double counting or over-counting of other kinds may still exist. The 
under-enumeration rate may be higher than that reported by the Chinese government. 
All these could impact on the conclusions drawn in this paper. We are interested in 
further examining these possibilities and their impacts, but this cannot be done because 
of the constraint imposed by data availability. 
The remarkable differences among major demographic data sources concerning 
China’s recently reported fertility levels and projected future population changes 
underscore the urgent need to further investigate these inconsistencies and their 
significant impacts on the formation of China’s future development plans and strategies. 
To clear the confusion and misunderstanding about China’s current demographic 
situation, which could profoundly influence the country’s long-term demographic 
changes and sustainable development, great efforts must be made to further improve the 
collection and publication of China’s demographic data and other statistics. In addition 
to necessary methodological and technological advancements, these efforts include 
increasing the transparency of data collection, adjustment, and publication, improving 
people’s right to know, and strengthening the legal protection of China’s statistics and 
the rights of statistical establishments. 
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